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in economic development. 
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1   Introduction 
As the interest on the underlying characteristics and driving forces of economic growth rose 
considerably during the last two decades, it was inevitable that many researchers would turn 
their attention to the implications of sustained growth for the quality of the natural 
environment. The fact that various by-products of economic activity (e.g., chemicals, toxins, 
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smoke, radioactive substances and litter) contaminate and erode the natural environment 
cannot be disputed. Yet, some authors have questioned the view that sustained economic 
growth may ultimately prove to be the source of natural catastrophe caused by unbounded 
environmental degradation. Their arguments are based on statistical evidence which, in the 
words of Brock and Scott-Taylor (2004), shows the “tendency for the environment to at first 
worsen at low levels of income but then improve at higher incomes” (Brock and Scott-
Taylor, 2004; p. 3).
1  
   Naturally, the identification of the determinants behind an inverse U-shaped relationship 
between various measures of pollution and per capita GDP took a prominent place in 
theoretical analyses that incorporated elements of environmental quality in otherwise 
standard economic frameworks. In a static model, Andreoni and Levinson (2001) attribute 
the emergence of the environmental Kuznets curve to the presence of increasing returns in 
the technology of pollution abatement: since output contributes to both environmental 
degradation (through the emission of pollutants) and pollution abatement, the presence of 
increasing returns in the latter’s technology can reproduce the functional relationship that is 
effectively the environmental Kuznets curve. In the dynamic frameworks of Stokey (1998) 
and Hartman and Kwon (2005), a central planner finds optimal to initiate pollution control, 
through the introduction of ‘cleaner’ technologies, only after a threshold level of output is 
surpassed. From that point onwards, it is possible for pollution to decline constantly at a rate 
which is proportional to the rate of output growth.
2 A similar story emerges in the 
overlapping generations framework of John and Peccherino (1994): although the initial 
stages of growth are associated with environmental deterioration due to the absence of 
pollution abatement, once the latter is implemented the environment may improve because 
economic growth supports abatement techniques.
3  
                                                 
1 For evidence on air pollutants such as sulphur dioxides, nitrogen oxides and smoke, see Millimet et al. (2003) 
and Aslanidis and Xepapadeas (2008) among others. Grossman and Krueger (1995) provide support for a 
number of water pollutants as well (e.g., chemical oxygen demand, biochemical oxygen demand and some 
heavy metals such as arsenic). 
2 The models by Stokey (1998) and Hartman and Kwon (2005) differ in their implications concerning the 
sustainability of the endogenously derived balanced growth path. 
3 See Kelly (2003) for a model that examines how variations in structural parameters may affect the shape of 
the relationship between emissions and capital accumulation (including the possibility of an environmental 
Kuznets curve).    3
   A common feature to all these analyses is the explanatory power of output movements in 
single-handedly determining the variations of pollution and environmental quality. Thus, 
given that the response of pollution to increasing levels of income eventually changes sign, 
the environmental Kuznets curve seems to imply that, as output grows and reaches 
sufficiently high levels, pollution will virtually disappear. Yet, under what circumstances 
could these implications emerge? The first one is the idea of modelling the environmental 
impacts of economic activity and pollution abatement as being separable. Normally, 
however, abatement is associated with activities that serve in mitigating pollution, so the 
suggestion that such activities may be able to override its negative impact altogether seems 
implausible. An even more crucial assumption has to do with the economy’s apparently 
unlimited scope in reducing its emission rate. Although many developed economies have 
been successful in reducing their emissions per unit of produced output (e.g., shifts in the 
composition of production, outsourcing, environmental regulation, environment-related 
R&D etc.) the fact still remains that, in all probability, the elimination of all the polluting by-
products of economic activity is nothing more than wishful thinking – at least for the 
foreseeable future. This is an important point because, insofar as the ‘cleanest’ possible 
technology still emits some pollutants, no matter how low these are, the implication would 
be that the growth process (by itself) will not be able to justify continuous reductions in the 
level of pollution – an idea that is important for the existence of a U-type relationship 
between environmental quality and GDP.  
   This paper aims at providing an alternative explanation for the observed pattern of co-
movements between output and various measures of pollution. Taking account of the 
preceding arguments, it focuses on steady-state levels rather than steady-state (i.e., sustained) 
growth for per capita income. Nevertheless, it is still able to reproduce co-movements for 
environmental quality and income per worker that constitute an ‘environmental Kuznets 
curve’, as it identifies them in terms of the dynamics experienced by an economy when it 
transits between two steady-state regimes for the stocks of physical capital and pollution. 
Ultimately, the present framework contributes to the ongoing debate by proposing the idea 
that environmental quality is a (partially) contributing rather than a passive factor in the 
possible emergence of an environmental Kuznets curve – an idea that has, surprisingly, 
eluded the attention of researchers.    4
      The novelty of the approach lies on the explicit account of the by-directional effects 
between economic activity and environmental quality. Specifically, I consider the positive 
repercussions of reduced pollution for economic outcomes in addition to production’s 
contribution to environmental degradation. I do this by utilising the idea that an improved 
environment contributes to a rise in life expectancy which, subsequently, promotes saving 
behaviour and capital accumulation. Moreover, I utilise the idea of threshold effects in the 
process of economic development – the threshold being identified as the level of income at 
which a ‘cleaner’ production method is implemented. The environmental Kuznets curve is 
then explained in terms of the transitional dynamics of an economy which, following a 
permanent structural change, moves from an original equilibrium below the threshold to a 
new equilibrium which is situated above this threshold. During the initial stages of this 
transition, capital accumulation leads to output growth which, for a given emission rate, 
causes pollution to rise. When the threshold is reached, however, the emission rate falls and 
leads to a new dynamic adjustment: from that point onwards it is the reduction in pollution 
that is largely responsible for output’s further growth towards the new equilibrium, as the 
improved environment reduces the risk of premature death and (by increasing the saving 
rate) promotes the accumulation of capital.  
   Following the tradition set by Barro (1990), among others, the paper also aims at providing 
conditions for which taxation can be conducive to economic development, as long as its 
proceeds are committed to productive purposes. In this framework, the productive use of 
tax receipts takes the form of publicly provided services towards health care – a policy that 
raises life expectancy. I show that, under a reasonable specification for the probability of 
survival, the tax rate that maximises the economy’s long-term development prospects is 
increasing in the parameters that cause and/or exacerbate environmental deterioration.  
      The remaining paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 I present the fundamental 
characteristics of the economy. In Section 3 I derive the steady-state equilibrium, check its 
stability and undertake the analysis of some comparative statics. Section 4 considers the 
implementation of less polluting production methods and shows how the environmental 
Kuznets curve can be attributed to the joint transitional dynamics and by-directional effects 
of pollution and capital accumulation, following a permanent structural change that 
promotes the formation of capital. In Section 5 I analyse the rate of public health spending 
which is most favourable to the prospects of economic development. Section 6 concludes.    5
                  
2   The Economy 
Time takes the form of discrete periods which are indexed by t  and measured from zero to 
infinity. In each period, there are two cohorts of agents inhabiting the economy – the young 
and the old. A mass of young agents (whose size I normalise to one) comes into existence at 
the beginning of each period. Each young agent is endowed with one unit of labour which 
she supplies inelastically to firms in exchange for the market wage  t w . She then decides how 
much to consume and how much to save for retirement, given that, when old, she does not 
have any labour endowment and, therefore, any alternative source of income from which she 
could finance her future consumption needs.  
   One deviation of this model from the standard overlapping generations setting (Diamond, 
1965) is the idea that survival to maturity is not certain. Instead, survival is determined by the 
realisation of a mortality shock. Specifically, I assume that a young person will survive to 
maturity with probability  (0,1) t ψ ∈ , whereas with probability 1 t ψ −  she dies prematurely and 
cannot enjoy any activities (mainly, consumption) when old. Provided that only agents who 
survive are able to consume in both periods, their ex ante (i.e., expected) lifetime utility is 
given by  
  1 ln ln
tt t
ttt Uc ψ c + =+ , (1) 
where 
j
i c  denotes consumption in period i  of an agent born in period  j . Each agent 
maximises her lifetime utility subject to the constraints for consumption during youth and 
old age. Denoting saving by  t s  and the gross rate of interest on deposits by  1 t r + , these 
constraints are given by 
t
tt t cws =−  and  11
t
tt t cr s ++ =  respectively.  
   The consumption good is produced and supplied by perfectly competitive firms. These 
firms hire labour from the young, denoted  t L , and capital from financial intermediaries, 
denoted  t K , and combine them to produce  t Y  units of output according to a neoclassical 
technology  (,) tt t YF K L =  with  0 i F >  and  0 ii F <  for  , tt iK L = .
4 The production function 
is assumed to be homogeneous of degree one in capital and labour. A functional form that 
                                                 
4 Capital depreciates completely in production.   6
satisfies these properties, and that will be employed hereafter, is 
1 ββ
tt t YB K L
− =  with  0 B >  
and 01 β << . The intensive (i.e., per worker) form is given by 
 
β
tt y Bk = , (2) 
where  / ttt yY L =  and  / tt t kKL = .  
   All firms are subject to a proportional tax  (0,1) τ ∈  on their production. Therefore, taking 




tt R τβ Bk
− =− , (3) 
and  
  (1 )(1 )
β
tt w τβ Bk =− − , (4) 
where  t R  is the rental price of capital.    
      Financial intermediaries undertake the task of channelling capital from households to 
firms. Specifically, they accept deposits by young agents and, in return, they offer the gross 
rate  1 t r + . They transform these saving deposits into capital by accessing a technology that 
transforms one unit of time-t  output into  0 q >  units of time- 1 t +  capital which they 
supply to firms at a rental cost of  1 t R +  per unit.
5 Following others (e.g., Chakraborty, 2004; 
Tang and Zhang, 2007), I appeal to the idea that the young deposit their saving to a mutual 
fund which promises to provide retirement income, provided that the depositor survives to 
old age. Otherwise, the income of those who die is shared equally by surviving members of 
the mutual fund. In view of this, and the assumption that financial intermediaries operate 
under perfect competition, we have 
  11 tt t ψ rq R + + = , (5) 
which implies that their costs (i.e., the total return to all surviving savers) must be equal to 
their revenues (i.e., the revenues they receive from firms who rent capital).  
   As already mentioned, the government levies taxes from firms, which amount to revenues 
of  t τY . The public sector uses these funds to provide goods and services towards public 
health care. Let us assume that the government abides by a balanced budget rule each period. 
As a result, we have  
                                                 
5 We may think of q  as the efficiency of the economy (in general) or of the financial sector (in particular) in 
successfully transforming resources into productive capital.    7
  tt h τY = . (6) 
In terms of intuition, public health expenditures may include salaries paid to medical staff 
(doctors, nurses etc.), maintenance of infrastructure (e.g., hospital buildings), enforcement of 
laws and regulations that preserve health and safety, and funding of medical research.   
   
2.1   Life Expectancy  
I assume that life expectancy, captured by the probability of survival  t ψ , is endogenous.
6 In 
particular, it takes the form of a function  
  Ψ() tt ψ x = ,  (7)   
such that Ψ 0 ′ > , Ψ 0 ′′< , Ψ(0) 0 = , Ψ() ( 0 , 1 ) λ ∞ =∈ , Ψ (0) 0 φ ′ = >  and Ψ ()0 ′ ∞= . I also 
impose the restriction Ψ()Ψ () tt t xx x ′ >   0 t x ∀ > .
7 Indicatively, a functional form that 










, with 0 1 λ < <  and λ φ = . 
   Naturally, the endogeneity of longevity is captured by the term  t x  for which I assume that 
it is related to public spending in health services, denoted  t h , and pollution, denoted  t μ , 
according to  (, ) tt t xX h μ = . This satisfies  0
t h X > ,   0
t μ X < ,  (0, ) ( , ) 0 tt X μ Xh = ∞=  and 








= . (8) 












such that Ψ 0
t h > ,  Ψ 0
t μ < ,  Ψ(0 ) Ψ() 0 tt h μ = =→ ∞ =  and Ψ() Ψ(0 ) tt h μλ →∞ = = = . 
Given  Ψ()Ψ () tt t xx x ′ >  it also follows that Ψ 0
tt hh <  and Ψ 0
tt μμ > . Once more, all these 
                                                 
6 The expected life span of a person born in t  is 2( 1) 1 tt t ψψψ + −= + . For this reason, I will be making use of 
such terms as ‘life expectancy’, ‘longevity’ and ‘survival probability’ interchangeably.       
7 This assumption, together with a restriction on the relative share of capital that will be imposed later, is 
essential to guarantee the stability of the economy’s long-run equilibrium.   8
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   In terms of intuition, the basic assumptions concerning life expectancy imply that, ceteris 
paribus, an increase in the provision of health services by the government and/or an 
improvement in environmental quality (that is, a reduction is the stock of pollutants) should 
have a beneficial impact on the longevity prospects of the population. These ideas conform 
to the evidence provided by numerous empirical studies on these issues (e.g., Anand and 
Ravallion, 1993; Pimentel et al., 1998).   
 
2.2   Pollution  
The pollution stock is denoted  t μ  and it evolves over time according to  
  1 tt t μη μ P + = + . (10) 
The parameter  (0,1) η∈  indicates the environment’s absorption capacity: higher values of η  
point to the nature’s reduced capacity in mitigating the cumulative impact of the current on 
the future pollution stock. The variable  t P  is the flow of pollution which determines the 
degrading impact of economic activity on environmental quality. Hence, it is related to total 
output according to  tt Pp Y = , where  0 p >  is an indicator of how ‘dirty’ the manufacturing 
process is – i.e., how many pollutant emissions are released into the environment per unit of 
output produced. Using  tt Pp Y =  in (10) yields 
  1 tt t μη μ pY + = + . (11) 
Equation (11) demonstrates how economic activity, combined with the existing level of 
pollution, contributes further to the decay of the natural environment by adding to the 
future pollution stock.   
 
3   Equilibrium  
Taking account of the fundamental relationships in the economy, we can describe its 
temporary equilibrium with 
   9
Definition 1.  The temporary equilibrium of the economy is a set of quantities 
{ }
1
11 ,, ,, , ,,,,, ,
tt t
t t t ttt t t t ttt cc cs L Y ψ Phμ KK
−
++  and prices { } 11 ,, , ttt t wRR r ++   such that: 
(i)  Given  t w,   t ψ ,  1 t r +  and  t μ , the quantities 
t
t c ,  1
t
t c +  and  t s  solve the optimisation problem of 
an agent born at time t ;  
(ii)  Given  t w  and  t R , firms choose quantities for  t L  and  t K  to maximise profits; 
(iii)  The labour market clears, i.e.,  1 t L = ; 




ttt t tt Ycψ cs h
−
− = ++ + ; 
(v)  The financial market clears, i.e.,  11 tt t ψ rq R + + = ; 
(vi)  The government’s budget is balanced, i.e.,  tt h τY = .  
 












The possibility of premature death induces the agent to modify her saving behaviour in 
response to variations in life expectancy. This is because an increase in the probability of 
survival raises the (expected) marginal utility of consumption when old. To restore the 
equilibrium, the marginal utility of her consumption when young must increase as well – 
something that the agent can achieve by saving more and consuming less during the first 
period of her lifetime.    
   The equilibrium condition  1 t L =  implies that  tt Kk =  and  tt Yy =   t ∀ . Therefore, using 
(4) and  1 tt kq s + = , equation (12) becomes  











where  Θ (1 )(1 ) τβ B =− − . Furthermore, we use  tt Yy =  together with (2), (6) and (9), and 
























Using  tt Yy =  and substituting (2) in (11) yields    10
  1 Μ(,)
β
ttt t t μη μ pBk k μ + =+ ≡ , (15) 
which represents the dynamics of the pollution stock. Thus, the economy’s dynamic 
equilibrium is formally described through     
   
Definition 2. For  00 ,0 k μ > , the dynamic equilibrium is a sequence of temporary equilibria that satisfy  
(i)  1 Κ(,) tt t kk μ + = ;  
(ii)  1 Μ(,) tt t μ k μ + = . 
 
   The economy’s long-run equilibrium – that is, its steady-state – is the solution to the planar 
system of difference equations for the stock of capital per worker and the stock of pollution. 
Formally, the steady-state equilibrium is a pair  ˆ ˆ (,) k μ  that satisfies  ˆˆ ˆ Κ(,) kk μ =   and 
ˆ ˆˆ Μ(,) μ k μ = . To obtain it, we use  1 ˆ
tt kk k + = =  and  1 ˆ tt μμ μ + = =  in equations (14) and (15). 





















− ⎧ ⎫ ⎡⎤ −
⎪ ⎪ ⎢⎥
⎪ ⎪ ⎣⎦ = ⎨ ⎬
⎡⎤ − ⎪ ⎪ + ⎢⎥ ⎪ ⎪ ⎣⎦ ⎩⎭
. (16) 













− ⎧ ⎫ ⎡⎤ −
⎪ ⎪ ⎢⎥
⎪ ⎪ ⎣⎦ = ⎨ ⎬
− ⎡⎤ − ⎪ ⎪ + ⎢⎥ ⎪ ⎪ ⎣⎦ ⎩⎭
. (17) 
   The foregoing analysis provides analytical and explicit solutions for the steady-state values 
of capital per worker and pollution. Prior to examining the economic implications of varying 
some structural parameters, we need to determine whether this long-run equilibrium is 
stable. As it turns out, an additional restriction on the relative share of capital is sufficient to 
guarantee the stability of the equilibrium. Formally, this is established in  
   11
Lemma 1. Suppose that 
1
2
β ≤ . Then the equilibrium pair  ˆ ˆ (,) k μ , with  ˆ ˆ ,0 k μ > ,  is locally stable.   
 
Proof. See the Appendix.  
 
   Thus, as long as the share of capital on national income is not high enough, the steady-
state equilibrium is non-trivial in the sense that the dynamics starting from any pair of initial 
values  00 (0 ,0 ) k μ >> , in the neighbourhood of  ˆ ˆ (,) k μ , will converge to  ˆ kk ∞ =   and 
ˆ μμ ∞ = . Notice that, although it may appear as a limiting scenario, the restriction 
1
2
β ≤  is 
supported by numerous empirical estimates who conclude that the relative share of capital 
income is significantly below 50% (e.g., Poterba, 1998; Gollin, 2002).  
   The equilibrium can be illustrated by means of the phase diagram in Figure 1. The PS locus 










 such that Ξ 0 ′ > ,  Ξ(0) 0 =  and Ξ() ∞ →∞. The CS locus is derived 







































. The next step is to analyse the derivative, 
11 1
11 2 2 1
(1 ) (1 ) Ψ
Φ
Ψ() (Θ ) Ψ() (Θ )[ Ψ() ](Θ )
t




β kk β kkβτBk
qk qk qk μ




⋅− ⋅− ⋅ −

















⎡ ⎤ ′ −
=− + − ⎢ ⎥ ⋅− − ⋅ ⎣ ⎦





























 in the third 









8 After substituting (2), (6) and (8), this expression becomes 12 β −  
which is non-negative given that 
1
2
β ≤  holds by assumption. However, if this expression is 
non-negative when using 
1
t x









Consequently,  Φ 0


















− ⎛⎞ = ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠
 while  t μ →∞ 
implies  Ψ() 0 ⋅=  and  0 t k = . The construction of the diagram is completed by observing 
that  Κ 0
t μ <  (see the Appendix) and Μ 0
t k > . These imply that above (below) the CS 
schedule we have  1 tt kk + <  ( 1 tt kk + > ) and on the left (right) of the PS schedule we have 
1 tt μμ + <  ( 1 tt μμ + > ).      
 
Figure 1. The phase diagram 
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3.1   Some Comparative Statics  
This part of the paper is devoted to the analysis of the equilibrium effects resulting from 
variations in the model’s (policy unrelated) structural parameters. These effects are 
summarised in  
 
Proposition 1. An economy with increased emissions and reduced natural absorption capacity will have 
lower income and higher pollution. More productive technologies are associated with higher income and higher 
pollution.  
 






ˆ 1( 1 ) ( 1 ) Ψ() ( 1 ) ( 1 ) Ψ () ( 1 )
0
11 Ψ() [ 1 Ψ() ]
β kq β B τ q β B ττ η
p β p
−
− ⎡⎤ ′ ⎡ ⎤ ∂− − ⋅ − − ⋅ −







ˆ 1( 1 ) ( 1 ) Ψ() ( 1 ) ( 1 ) Ψ ()
0
11 Ψ() [ 1 Ψ() ]
β kq β B τ q β B ττ
ηβ p
−
− ⎡⎤ ′ ⎛ ⎞ ∂− − ⋅ − − ⋅













− ⎡⎤ ∂− − ⋅














− ⎡⎤ ∂− − ⋅
=> ⎢⎥ ∂− + ⋅ ⎣⎦
. 
From (17) we have  
 
11 1
1 ˆ (1 ) (1 )Ψ() ( 1 ) ( 1 ) Ψ()
0
11 Ψ() 1 1 1 Ψ()
ββ
β ββ




− ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ∂− − ⋅ − − ⋅














− ⎡⎤ ∂− − ⋅
=> ⎢⎥ ∂− − + ⋅ ⎣⎦






ˆ (1 ) (1 )Ψ()
11 Ψ() 1
(1 ) (1 )Ψ() ( 1 ) ( 1 ) Ψ () ( 1 )
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⎡⎤ ∂− − ⋅
=+ × ⎢⎥ ∂− + ⋅ − ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ ′ ⎡ ⎤ −− ⋅ −− ⋅ −









ˆ (1 ) (1 )Ψ()
(1 ) 1 Ψ() 1
(1 ) (1 )Ψ() ( 1 ) ( 1 ) Ψ ()
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μ Bp q β B τ pB
ηη η






⎡⎤ ∂− − ⋅
=+ × ⎢⎥ ∂− + ⋅ − ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ ′ ⎛ ⎞ −− ⋅ −− ⋅
− ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ −+ ⋅ + ⋅ ⎣⎦ ⎝ ⎠
 (19) 
After some manipulation, equations (18) and (19) can be written as  
 
1 ˆ (1 ) (1 )Ψ() ( 1 ) Ψ ()
1
11 Ψ() 1 Ψ() [ 1 Ψ() ]
β
β μ Bq β B τβ τ η
p ηβ p
− ⎡⎤ ⎡ ′ ⎤ ∂− − ⋅ − ⋅






ˆ (1 ) (1 )Ψ() ( 1 ) Ψ ()
1
(1 ) 1 Ψ() 1 Ψ() [ 1 Ψ() ]
β
β μ Bp q β B τβ τ η
ηη β p
− ⎡⎤ ⎡ ′ ⎤ ∂− − ⋅ − ⋅
=− ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ∂− + ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
, (21) 
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 because  1/2 β ≤  holds. However, we know that 
ˆˆ 1 Ψ () Ψ ()






 holds by assumption. Taking account of equations (20) and 
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      An economy that employs more polluting manufacturing techniques (i.e., higher  p)  
and/or possesses a limited absorption capacity (i.e., higher η ) will experience a deterioration 
of environmental quality. This worsens the health profile of the population, leads to lower 
life expectancy and acts as an incentive to reduce saving. The process of capital accumulation 
is impeded and causes a decline in production and, therefore, income. The latter effect   15
imposes some reduction in overall pollutant emissions which is not strong enough, however, 
to counteract the increase in pollution resulting from the higher rate of emissions per unit 
manufactured goods. Eventually, the economy will settle down to a new long-run 
equilibrium with lower income and higher pollution.  
   An improvement in the productivity of the manufacturing process (i.e., higher B) will 
promote aggregate savings due to the rise in wages, while an improvement in the efficiency 
of the financial sector (i.e., higher q) will improve the process of capital formation for given 
amounts of saving . Both result in greater accumulation of capital which stimulates economic 
activity. The rise in aggregate production has two conflicting effects on the prospects of 
longevity. On the one hand, it leads to an increase in the tax revenues which are used to fund 
the provision of health services. On the other hand, the stimulated activity implies that more 
pollutants are emitted in the environment. As it turns out, these two conflicting effects will 
cancel each other out and, eventually, the economy will settle to a new long-run equilibrium 
with higher income and more pollution.              
 
4  Threshold Effects, Permanent Structural Change and   
Income-Pollution Dynamics 
The previous analysis has demonstrated that the reduction in the emission indicator (i.e., the 
parameter  p) could be crucial in generating an equilibrium that combines higher income and 
improved environmental conditions. An important aspect that facilitates this result is this 
frameworks’ explicit account of the direct impact of environmental quality on economic 
activity (through life expectancy). A natural direction of analysis is to consider the possibility 
that such outcomes may lie at the core of empirical observations which show that, while 
economic growth is associated with increased environmental degradation at relatively low 
levels of development, it is also associated with reductions in various measures of pollution 
at relatively higher levels of development. Both these observations have been commonly 
associated with the presence of an environmental Kuznets curve (EKC hereafter) – that is, 
an inverse U-shaped relationship between pollution and income. The purpose of this Section 
is to provide an alternative explanation for its emergence.      16
      Rather than assuming that the indicator of the technology’s dirtiness is a constant 
parameter, let us consider the case where it is an endogenous variable determined according 
to  () tt p ρ Y = . The idea is that a more developed economy has achieved a level of 
knowledge, sophistication and expertise, and has the necessary resources to be able to 
implement a process of pollution abatement that mitigates the damaging effect of economic 
activity on the environment. In technical terms, this implies that  t p  is a negative function of 
t Y . This may happen because the government can use part of its revenues towards pollution 
abatement activities. It could also emerge in a scenario whereby individuals’ preferences 
include a ‘warm glow’-type argument inducing them to choose to devote a fraction of their 
labour earnings for environmentally-friendly activities. For the purposes of this analysis, I 
will treat the effect of  t Y  on  t p  as an externality indicating that, as production increases, the 
participants in the economy become more familiar with certain aspects of the underlying 
production process – more importantly, with the way through which it demotes 
environmental quality. This gives them the necessary knowledge on ways to mitigate this 
damaging impact – knowledge that, subsequently, spreads without cost over the whole 
economy in the manner of a public good.  


















where  pp > . Again, as production takes place, the participants of the economy acquire 
knowledge on how to implement a method which minimises the emission generator. In this 
respect, the threshold could indicate that the economy has accumulated the necessary 
resources that allow the actual implementation of this technique. Given equation (2) and 
















, (23)   17
where 
1/ (/)
β kY B =   . In that case of course, the PS locus will change and take the form of a 












 for which the 







 . Its graph also illustrates the earlier 
claim that, as long as environmental improvements are bounded, the EKC cannot be 
explained just by the impact of economic activity on the environment: in this case, the effect 
of  t k  on  t μ  resembles an ‘N’-shaped rather than an ‘inverse-U’ shaped curve. Another 
important implication from this analysis is the possibility of multiple, non-trivial steady-state 
equilibria, as demonstrated from  
 








  . Then, there exist two pairs of locally stable 
steady-state equilibria, 
11 ˆ ˆ (,) k μ  and 
22 ˆ ˆ (,) k μ , such that 
21 ˆˆ kk k >>   and 
21 ˆˆ μμ < . 
 
Proof. Let us begin with the values for capital intensity that satisfy  t kk < . Given 








 ,0 Ξ(0) (0) Z = <→ ∞ ,  Ξ() 0 ′ ⋅ >  and  ( ) 0 Z′ ⋅ < , a steady-state equilibrium 
11 ˆ ˆ (,) k μ  with 
1 ˆ kk <  exists. Analogously, for values of capital intensity that satisfy  t kk ≥  we 
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,  Ξ() 0 ′ ⋅>  and 
() 0 Z′ ⋅< . Therefore, a steady-state equilibrium 
22 ˆ ˆ (,) k μ  with 
2 ˆ kk >  exists. Of course, 
() 0 Z′ ⋅<  and 
21 ˆˆ kk >  imply that 
21 2 1 ˆˆ ˆˆ () () Zk Zk μμ < ⇒< . Analytically, these pair of 
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By appealing to Proposition 1, we can readily verify that 
21 ˆˆ kk >  and 
21 ˆˆ μμ < , while the local 
stability of these equilibria can be inferred from Lemma 1.   ■    
 
   The situation described above is illustrated in Figure 2. Given that all other parameters 
determining the CS schedule are unchanged, the increase in equilibrium income necessitates 
an improvement in survival prospects brought forward by improvements in environmental 
quality. The drop in the emission rate is indeed sufficient enough to guarantee that pollutant 
emissions are lower, even though production is higher for 
21 ˆˆ kk > . The emergence of 
multiple equilibria illustrates the important point that it is possible for a more developed 
country to enjoy better environmental conditions. Of course, the implementation of a 
technique which is able to reduce the amount of pollutants per unit of produced output is 
necessary for the existence of this scenario. However, this is not by itself sufficient. Another 
requirement to ensure this outcome derives from the positive repercussions of reduced 
pollution for economic activity – exemplified by the negative slope of the CS schedule which 
illustrates the importance of environmental quality in reducing the risk of early mortality and, 
thus, promoting capital accumulation. This argument becomes transparent once we consider 
the case whereby pollution does not impinge on life expectancy: in this case, the CS schedule 
becomes a line vertical to the horizontal axis at the steady-state level of capital intensity. No 
matter how sharp the drop in pollutant emissions may be, multiple equilibria cannot exist.  
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Figure 2. Threshold effects 
 
   The situation illustrated in Figure 2 depicts a scenario which is conceptually similar to the 
type of threshold effects studied by Azariadis and Drazen (1990). Effectively, it implies that 
only economies with a sufficient endowment of capital will be able to achieve the relatively 
high income state; otherwise, they will eventually converge to the lower level of equilibrium 
income. Of course, it may be inappropriate and historically inaccurate to attribute the 
income differences between industrialised economies and less-developed countries simply to 
the fact that the former happened to be endowed with more resources when they initiated 
their process of economic development. A more plausible argument would attribute their 
better economic performance to certain events and actions (like political, institutional and 
other structural reforms) that stimulated economic activity in a manner that enhanced their 
future prospects and allowed them to escape low income traps. In terms of the present 
framework, one may thing of such events as illustrated by a rightward shift in the CS locus – 








 . This could allow economies with not 
such a high initial endowment to surpass the threshold given by k .         
   How may these arguments relate to the joint dynamics of economic development and 
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combined with the idea that the interactions between environmental quality and economic 
activity are by-directional, could provide an alternative explanation for the observation that 
led researchers to argue in favour of an EKC when it comes to the linkages between the rate 
of change in output and changes in environmental conditions. A useful result in 
understanding these issues is provided with    
 
Proposition 2. Consider an economy at the equilibrium point  
11 ˆ ˆ (,) k μ  with 
1 ˆ kk < . Now suppose that 
q increases so that  () t Z k  shifts to 
*() t Z k  which is sufficient to guarantee 








 . As long 
as 
* Ξ() () κ Z κ < , where 
*( 1) 1 ˆ () κ Z μ
− = , then the economy will experience a dynamic transition and 
eventually converge to a new equilibrium point 
33 ˆ ˆ (,) k μ , such that 
31 ˆˆ kk k >>   and 
31 ˆˆ μμ < . 
 
Proof. Since  () 0 Z′ ⋅<  and Ξ() 0 ′ ⋅> , after the shift we have








  which 
certainly implies that 
11 ˆˆ Ξ() () kZ k <  for 
1 ˆ kk < . The new equilibrium for capital intensity 
must certainly be located above the threshold k . Whether the new equilibrium for pollution 
is below or above the original one depends on whether the point for which 
1* * ( 1 ) 1 ˆˆ () ( ) μ Z κκ Z μ
− =⇒ =   satisfies 
* Ξ() () κ Z κ <  or 
* Ξ() () κ Z κ >   respectively. If the 
former condition holds, then pollution will decline. Thus, 
33 ˆ ˆ (,) k μ  satisfies 
31 ˆˆ kk k >>   and 
31 ˆˆ μμ < .   ■       
 
   To understand the transitional dynamics from the original to the new equilibrium, let us 
examine the graph of Figure 3. Following the permanent improvement in the rate at which 
resources are transformed into capital (i.e., q), the original equilibrium point 
11 ˆ ˆ (,) k μ  
becomes, effectively, the initial point of a new dynamic adjustment. Due to the increase in 
the rate of capital accumulation, income will grow and (for a given emission rate) pollution 
will increase. Nevertheless, as the economy evolves and reaches k , there is a new structural 
break resulting from the implementation of the ‘cleaner’ manufacturing method which will 
lead the economy to a new transition path towards the steady-state equilibrium. As long as 
the condition described in Proposition 2 holds, pollution will have to decline towards this   21
new steady-state equilibrium. As this happens, the improvement in survival prospects 
supports an increase in the social marginal product of capital which stimulates the rate of 
capital accumulation and causes output to grow even further as it converges to its new 
equilibrium. The latter is an important point in this particular interpretation of the EKC – as 
this is illustrated by the shape of the transitional dynamics from the original to the new 
equilibrium. To clarify this, suppose that the drop in the emission rate at k  is not possible, 
meaning that the PS locus is continuously monotonic. In such a case (and for the same 
increase in q), capital and pollution will increase towards a new equilibrium for which capital 
intensity will be below 
3 ˆ k  and pollution above 
3 ˆ μ . What this implies is that, after the drop 
in the emission rate at k , it is the reduction in pollution that, to a large extent, causes output 
to grow above the level justified by the structural change which was originally induced by the 
permanent rise in q.  
   Thus, what looks like an EKC does not necessarily imply that the process of economic 
growth/development is, by itself, sufficient enough to explain the changes in various aspects 
of environmental quality. To a certain extent, improvements in environmental quality are 
partially responsible for changes in the processes of economic growth and development as 
well. The scenario can be summarised in  
 
Corollary 1. In the transition from 
11 ˆ ˆ (,) k μ  to 
33 ˆ ˆ (,) k μ , capital intensity and pollution will initially 
grow, until the threshold k  is surpassed. Then pollution will decline and capital intensity will increase further 
towards the new equilibrium. Thus, for  t kk < ,  as income grows it causes pollution to increase while, after 
the reform which carries the economy above k , as pollution declines the economy grows even further. 
 
In other words, the EKC may be the result of the by-directional effects that shape the joint 
transitional dynamics of pollution and capital accumulation. 
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Figure 3. Permanent structural change and transitional dynamics 
 
5   Health Spending and Economic Development 
As we have already seen, the government imposes a proportional tax on production and uses 
the proceeds in order to finance the provision of public health services. In this Section, I 
consider the effects of this policy on the development prospects of the economy. For this 
reason, I will return my attention to the situation in which the economy generates the 
unique, interior equilibrium given in (16) and (17).  
   While considering the impact of taxation on capital accumulation and income we have to 
bear in mind that there are two conflicting effects at work. On the one hand, an increase in 
taxation crowds out private investment by reducing the amount of funds available for saving. 
On the other hand, it allows the government to provide more essential health services which 
promote capital accumulation because they reduce the risk of untimely death. The 
implication from these combined effects is formally described in  
 
Lemma 3. There is a unique tax rate  *( 0 , 1 ) τ ∈  that maximises equilibrium income. As a result it 
satisfies  ˆ/*0 k τ ∂∂>  for  * ττ <  and  ˆ/*0 k τ ∂ ∂<  for  * ττ > .   
t k  
PS 
CS 
1 ˆ k  
1 ˆ μ  
k   
3 ˆ μ  
3 ˆ k  
t μ    23
 
Proof. Equation (16) reveals that the two limiting cases of  0 τ =  and  1 τ =  lead to  ˆ 0 k = . 
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β β kqβ B τη
τ
τβ p
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. 
If we factorise with 1/[1 Ψ() ] +⋅  we can clearly see that the sign of this expression depends 
on the sign of  
 
Ψ () ( 1 )









We can check that, for  0 τ = , we have Ψ() 0 ⋅ = ,  Ψ () λ ′ ⋅ =  and, therefore, equation (22) is 
positive. Similarly, when  1 τ =  we have Ψ() 0 ⋅ >  therefore equation (22) is negative. 
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,  
which is clearly negative given that Ψ 0 ′ >  and Ψ 0 ′′< . We conclude that there exists some 
* τ  such that  ˆ/*0 k τ ∂∂= ,  ˆ/*0 k τ ∂∂>  for  * ττ <  and  ˆ/*0 k τ ∂ ∂<  for  * ττ > .   ■      
 
   When  * ττ <  (* ττ > ), the benefit (in terms of higher life expectancy) of a marginal 
increase in the tax rate is higher (lower) that the corresponding cost, which takes the form of 
the reduction in funds available for saving. Naturally, there exists a tax rate which balances 
these two effects and can lead to the maximum equilibrium level for capital intensity and 
income. Although  * τ  is evidently related to the parameters that determine environmental 
quality, it is not possible to determine (with certainty) how the income-maximising tax rate 
responds to variations in these parameters, when using the general specification for the 
survival probability. However, it is possible to determine these effects after specifying a 
functional form for Ψ() ⋅ . The result is summarised in 
 








. Then  * Τ(,) τ p η =  such that Τ ,Τ 0 p η > . 
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Proof. Using (2), (6), (8), (16) and (17), we can establish that, in the steady-state, we have 
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. 
Since 0 τ =  and  1 τ =  cannot be maximising choices for  ˆ k, * τ  is derived by setting {} 0 ⋅= . 
Therefore,   
  2
*(1 ) (1 *) (1 )
(1 ) *(1 ) [ (1 ) *(1 )]
λτ η p τλ η
p λτ η p λτ η
−− −
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2 (* )( 1 ) ( 1 ) 2 * 0 τλ η pτ p + −+ − =. (24) 
 The expression in (24) is a quadratic equation with only one positive solution  
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.   ■       
 
   The above analysis allows us to make an inference in the form of  
 
Corollary 2. Under a reasonable specification for the survival probability, and as long as tax proceeds are 
used productively, a change in structural characteristics indicating greater environmental degradation imply 
that an increase in taxation may support the economy’s long-run development prospects. 
 
A rise in the parameter values that indicate greater environmental degradation, will reduce 
the marginal losses and will have an ambiguous effect in the marginal gains resulting from a 
higher tax rate. This is because the parameters  p and η  lead to a decline of life expectancy 
(reducing the cost, in terms of foregone expected income, due to higher taxation) and 
impede the overall health profile which, given diminishing returns for Ψ() ⋅ , implies an 
increase in the benefit from a marginal rise in longevity. Despite the fact that  p and η  are 









 the former effects dominate and the most conducive tax rate, in terms of 
economic development, is positively related with the parameters  p and η .  
 
6   Conclusions 
In this paper, I have constructed a model in which the dynamics of pollution and capital 
accumulation interact and are, therefore, jointly determined. While capital accumulation is 
responsible for the built-up of more pollutants, the latter reduce capital formation due to 
their detrimental effect on life expectancy and, therefore, saving behaviour. I have shown a 
scenario whereby these joint dynamics provide a different explanation for the observed co-
movements of per capita GDP and pollution – co-movements that have been associated 
with the presence of an environmental Kuznets curve. I have also used this framework to 
examine how variations in environment-related parameters determine the effect of taxation   26
in economic development, when tax revenues contribute to the provision of public health 
care.  
   The mechanisms and the intuition behind all the results indicate the importance of having 
a consistent account of the impact of environmental quality on economic activity. Naturally, 
when considering various factors that may link pollution to economic growth, the health 
status emerges as a prominent candidate – it is affected by the quality of the environment 
and it certainly affects economic behaviour, decisions and, ultimately, outcomes. In addition 
to variations in life expectancy, the detrimental effect of environmental degradation on the 
health characteristics of the population may be channelled to economic growth as a result of 
variations in labour productivity or variations in the ability of agents to undertake a task with 
direct effects on the economic environment – Gradus and Smulders (1993) have, for 
example, considered the possibility that a polluted environment can influence the ability of 
agents to accumulate human capital through deliberate learning activities. Undoubtedly, the 
explicit modelling of all these ideas will enrich our understanding of many important issues 
pertaining to the growth-environment nexus and, thus, represent a fruitful avenue for future 
research work.          
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
The Jacobian matrix associated with the dynamical system of (14) and (15) is  
 
ˆˆ ˆˆ Κ (,) Κ (,)





k μ k μ






The trace and the determinant are given by  ˆˆ ˆˆ Κ (,) Μ (,)
tt k μ Tk μ k μ =+ and 
ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ Κ (,) Μ (,) Κ (,) Μ (,)
tt tt k μμ k Dk μ k μ k μ k μ =− respectively. It is well known (e.g., de la Croix 
and Michel, 2002) that the stability of the equilibrium is established when the conditions 
(1 )(1 ) 0 DT DT +− ++ >  and  1 D <  hold simultaneously. 
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In the steady-state we have 









 therefore (A3) becomes 2β . 
Of course, 2 1 β ≤  given that  1/2 β ≤  by assumption. But since 
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by assumption, then 
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. Consequently, if (A3) cannot take a 
value above unity then, from (A2), it is certainly  ˆ ˆ 0 Κ (,) 1
t k k μ < < . 
   Using equation (15) we get  ˆ ˆ Μ (,) ( 0 , 1 )
t μ k μη =∈  which implies that  ˆ ˆ Κ (,) 0
t k T η k μ = +> . 
Furthermore, we can use (14) and (15) to derive  
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Thus, (A4) and (A5), combined with previous results, imply that 
ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ Κ (,) Κ (,) Μ (,) 0
tt t k μ k D η k μ k μ k μ =− >  and 1 0 DT + +> . Additionally, we can derive  
  ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ 1 Κ (,) Κ (,) Μ (,) Κ (,)1
tt t t k μ kk DT η k μ k μ k μη k μ −+ = − − − + ⇒  
  ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ 11 ( 1 ) Κ (,) Κ (,) Μ (,)
tt t k μ k DT ηη k μ k μ k μ − +=−− − − ⇒  
  ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ 1( 1 ) [ 1Κ (,) ] Κ (,) Μ (,)
tt t k μ k DT η k μ k μ k μ −+ =− − − . 
Given (A4), (A5) and  ˆ ˆ 0 Κ (,) 1
t k k μ << , we have  1 0 DT − +> which means that 
(1 ) (1 ) 0 DT DT ++ −+>. Consequently, since  0 D > , we need to show that  1 D <  in 
order to establish the stability of the equilibrium.  
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Next, we can combine (A2) and (A8) to derive the determinant  
  ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ Κ (,) Κ (,) Μ (,)
tt t k μ k D η k μ k μ k μ =− ⇒  
 
2 Ψ () ( 1 ) ( 1 ) Ψ ()









Ψ () ( 1 )
[( 1) ]
Ψ() [ 1 Ψ() ]
τη
D βη η η
p
⎧′ ⎫ ⋅−




Ψ () ( 1 )



















In the steady-state we have 




= . Substituting in (A10) yields  (1 ) 1 β η +<  because 
1/2 β ≤  and 0 1 η <<. However, it is 
ˆˆ 1 Ψ () Ψ ()












′ >  
holds by assumption. This implies that, if (A10) is below 1, then, given (A9), we can 
conclude that  1 D <  as well. Hence, we have proven that the equilibrium  ˆ ˆ ,0 k μ >  is locally 
stable.   ■  
 
 